Abstract: By the end of the 1990s, the Singaporean government had recognised the need to open up its banking sector so as to remain competitive in the global economy. The Monetary Authority of Singapore thus began deregulation of the banking sector in 1999 to strengthen the competitiveness of local banks relative to their foreign competitors through mergers. This paper employs a nonparametric Malmquist productivity index to provide measure of productivity, technological change and efficiency gains over the period [1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005]. The findings reveal some total factor productivity growth associated with deregulation and scale efficiency improvement largely from mergers amongst the local banks.
Introduction
Since the beginning of the 1980s, financial institutions in many parts of the world have undergone changes brought about by deregulation, globalisation, privatisation and the rapid pace of development in information technology. This phenomenon is very evident in countries such as Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. Similar developments are found in the Singaporean banking sector whereby recent regulatory changes have been spurred by the challenges of global competition.
Singapore's central bank, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS), recognized the need to deregulate its financial sector and open its domestic banking and insurance industries to foreign competition. This was undertaken not only to remain competitive in the global economy, but also to strengthen its banking system in terms of the quality of banking services and to maintain or increase market share. Both the Singaporean government and the MAS were well aware of the small stature of local banks by international standards and lags behind international banks "…in terms of technology, expertise, range and quality of service to customers" (MAS, 1999, p.1) .
Recent technological developments have led to banking services being no longer restricting to 'bricks and mortar' over-the-counter services with e-banking becoming more prevalent. This new approach to banking enables foreign banks to extensively reach out to domestic customers, which, in a matter of time, would further reduce and neutralise the advantages of an extensive branch network and implicit and explicit government protection (MAS, 1999) .
In 1997, MAS reviewed its regulatory policies and in 1999, launched the first phase of a five-year programme aimed at liberalising the banking sector in Singapore. The programme, essentially aimed at the development and upgrading of local banks, had three key features: (i) an increase in competition from giving access to foreign banks to enter the domestic market; (ii) strengthening the corporate governance of local banks and attracting leadership talent so as to reach a level of autonomy mature enough to make professional management decisions; and (iii) lifting the forty percent foreign shareholding limit. With the onset of deregulation, the role of MAS changed from regulation to supervision with the aim to "…monitor and differentiate among institutions by giving the stronger and well-managed ones more operational flexibility while maintaining stricter controls on the weaker ones" (MAS, 1998, p. 29) .
The onus was now on banks to effectively govern themselves through the setting-up of Nominating Committees to offer appointments to key management positions. The five-year programme, which includes a package of new banking privileges and licences for foreign banks, opened up the domestic banking sector in terms of the issuing of full banking licenses, known as Qualifying Full Banks (QFBs), to foreign banks. The first phase of the programme saw four foreign banks being awarded QFB privileges in October 1999. These comprised ABNO Amro Bank MV, Banque Nationale de Paris, Citibank NA, and Standard Chartered Bank. In addition, an additional eight Qualifying Offshore Banks (QOBs) and eight wholesale bank licenses were granted in the first phase of the programme. Table 1 with the rising number of Wholesale banks and the falling number of Offshore banks.
Revisions to the QFB licenses were also carried out in the second phase with an increase in the number of locations from ten to fifteen. Prior to revision of the QFB licenses, foreign banks were allowed up to ten locations, of which five could be branches. The new privileges attached to the QFB license now increased the limits of individuals. Offshore banks, besides having the same restrictions imposed on Wholesale banks, have slightly more restrictions on dealings with residents in terms of the acceptance of interest-bearing deposits from resident non-bank customers other than approved financial institutions. Further, the credit limit was limited to S$300 million to non-bank customers who are Singapore residents. But with liberalisation, the QOB privileges were relaxed and allowed to have their lending limit raised to S$1 billion, from the previous limit of S$300 million. QOBs were also be allowed to accept S$ funds from non-bank customers through swap transactions. foreign banks to fifteen locations, of which ten could be branches and the remainder as off-site automated teller machines (ATMs). In addition, QFBs could also provide debit services through Electronic Funds Transfer at Point of Sale (EFTPOS) networks, thus enhancing competition in retail banking through the permitted issue of debit cards to consumers.
As shown in Table 1 However, failure to effectively supervise can have dire consequences, as realised in the 1991-1993 banking crises in Norway and Sweden. Many banks suffered severely from substantial credit losses as a result of poor management and failure to appropriately evaluate the risk-levels. In addition, the financial system problems are associated with the deflation of real estate values (Bartholomew 1994; Ball 1994 ).
The eventual outcome was government intervention through the issue of general guarantees and bailing out banks (Lindblom, 1994) . In Norway, the two largest banks in Norway; Denorske Bank (DnB) and Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse (CBK), were nationalised. The government's long-term goal was to retain a substantial minority position (20-33.33%) over these two banks. In Sweden, the measures were less drastic with government bailouts (Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken in Sweden).
. The aim of this paper is two-fold. First, we measure and attempt to explain productivity change in the deposits-loans segment of the banking industry. Second, to seek out and determine whether the merger of local banks as a result of deregulation improved productivity over the period 1995 to 2005. The estimates of productivity growth in Singapore's banking over the period 1995-2005 are derived using the Malmquist productivity index. This approach has two distinguishing features which makes it ideal for a study such as this. First, it does not require prices of resources used and services provided, and it does not require a behavioural assumption such as profit maximisation in competitive markets. Second, sources of any productivity change are established by decomposing the Malmquist productivity index into changes in productive efficiency (catching-up up to the best-practice frontier) and changes in the production frontier (technological change). While a myriad of factors may have contributed to changes in bank productivity over this period, deregulation is arguably the most significant event within the banking sector.
The paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 describes the Malmquist productivity index and its decomposition. Section 3 describes the inputs and outputs employed and the limitations faced. Section 4 presents the results in terms of productivity change, technological change and efficiency change and assess their significance in relation to deregulation. The paper concludes with some brief remarks.
Malmquist Productivity Index
The current study employs the nonparametric input-oriented Malmquist productivity index that decomposes productivity change into technical change and technical efficiency change. This approach has been adopted by many studies analysing productivity at the industry level, including Färe, Grosskopf, Lindgren, & Roos (1992) in the pharmaceutical industry, Hjalmarsson and Veiderpass (1992) in electricity retail distribution and Price and Weyman-Jones (1996) in the gas industry, among others. In terms of banking and finance services, related studies include Berg, Forsund and Jansen (1992) , Fukuyama (1995) , Gilbert and Wilson (1998), Worthington (1999) , Rebelo and Mendes (2000) , Alam (2001), Mukherjee, Ray and Miller (2001) , Isik and Hassan (2003) , Casu, Girardone and Molyneux (2004), Sturm and Williams (2004) and Rezitis (2006) .
INSERT FIGURE 1
The framework can be illustrated by Figure 1 following Färe, Grosskopf, Norris and Zhang (1994) , and Coelli, Rao and Battese (1998) . In this diagram, a production frontier representing the efficient level of output (y) that can be produced from a given level of input (x) is constructed, and the assumption made that this frontier can shift over time. The frontiers (F) thus obtained in the current (t) and future (t+1) time periods are labelled accordingly. When inefficiency is assumed to exist, the relative movement of any given financial institution over time will therefore depend on both its position relative to the corresponding frontier (technical efficiency) and the position of the frontier itself (technical change). If inefficiency is ignored, then productivity growth over time will be unable to distinguish between improvements that derive from a financial institution 'catching up' to the frontier, or those that result from the frontier itself shifting up over time.
Now for any given financial institution in period t, say, represented by the output/input bundle z t , the inputs used are x t and the output is y t . But this is technically inefficient since the financial institution lies below the production frontier: with the available technology and the same level of inputs the financial institution should be able to produce output y a . In the next period there is a technology increase such that more outputs can be produced for any given level of inputs: the frontier moves upward to F t+1 . Assume the financial institution's output/input bundle is now represented by z t+1 with input x t+1 and output y t+1 . Once again the financial institution is inefficient, but in reference to the new technology, and should be producing output y c if it was efficient. The challenge for productivity assessment is to sort these increases in output relative to the level of inputs into that associated with the change in efficiency and that associated with the change in technology.
It is possible using the input-orientated Malmquist productivity index to decompose this total productivity change between the two periods into technical change and technical efficiency change. Input-orientation refers to the emphasis on the equiproportionate reduction of inputs, within the context of a given level of output.
Studies such as Berg, Forsund and Jansen (1992) , Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994) , Fukuyama (1995) , Gilbert and Wilson (1998) , and Rebelo and Mendes (2000) employed this approach. Following Fare, Grosskopf and Lovell (1994) , the inputoriented Malmquist productivity change index is expressed as:
where the superscript I indicates an input-orientation, M is the productivity of the most recent production point (x t+1 , y t+1 ) (using period t + 1 technology) relative to the earlier production point (x t , y t ) (using period t technology), D are input distance functions, and all other variables are as previously defined. Values greater than unity indicate positive total factor productivity (TFP) growth between the two periods. An equivalent way of writing this index is: 
and M (Malmquist TFP) is the product of a measure of technical progress P as measured by shifts in the frontier measured at period t + 1 and period t (the geometric mean of the two ratios in the square bracket) and a change in efficiency E over the same period (the term outside the square bracket). Using this approach, four efficiency/productivity indices are provided for each financial institution along with a measure of technical progress over time. 
Data and Input/Output Specification
The data consist of annual observations of twenty-six commercial banks over the were included in the sample. Third, only the largest banks in terms of total assets within these categories were selected but largely dependent on availability of archived data from ACRA. The sample size of 26 banks is nonetheless in some way still representative of the banking industry. Bank sizes ranging from SG$1.9 billion to SG$106 billion in 2000 allows the study to analyse productivity growth based on the utilisation of inputs and not driven by the institution size which is not a focus of the current study.
The issue of determining outputs and inputs is highly dependent on the development process on what banks actually produce. This has been an on-going contentious issue in the banking literature (see Berger and Humphrey, 1992) . In general, there are two main approaches to classifying outputs and inputs; the production approach and the intermediation approach. The production approach employed in studies like Sherman and Gold (1985), Berg, Forsund and Jansen (1992) , Berg and Humphrey (1992) , and
Drake (2001) consider deposit-taking institutions as the producers of services associated with the loans and deposit accounts. Hence, loans and deposits are 'produced' with inputs like capital and labour. In contrast, the intermediation approach consider financial institutions as intermediaries and that the sole purpose of banks is to raise funds through deposits and/or borrowed wholesale funds (managed liabilities) and transform these into loans and other earning assets. This approach thus identifies loans and other earning assets as outputs while deposits and borrowed funds together with capital and labour as inputs. Studies that adopted the intermediation approach include Millar and Noulas (1996) , Gilbert and Wilson (1998) , Rebelo and
Mendes (2000), and Drake (2001) .
In the context of Singapore's commercial banks, Leong and Dollery (2004) noted that the quantum of high value-added deposits compared to time and savings deposits is relatively small. Further, given the fact that foreign banks are legally restricted in their ability to accept Singapore dollar deposits, this would imply that their revenue share of interest-bearing assets would be larger than deposits (Leong and Dollery, 2004) . It is based on these rationales that the current study employs the intermediation approach and identifies one output: loans to non-bank customers (y 1 ) and three inputs:
customer deposits (x 1 ), fixed assets (x 2 ), and personnel/staff costs (x 3 ) 5 5 Fixed assets are made up of motor vehicles, equipment, furniture and fittings, and leasehold improvements. This implies that fixed assets refer to physical inputs or physical capital which excludes assets such as loans and securities. The adoption of fixed assets as inputs follows the intermediation approach as employed in studies such as Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1996) ; Gilbert and Wilson (1998); Worthington (1999) ; Alam (2001); and Drake (2001) . In regards to number of employees which is used in other studies, the current study uses staff costs. Conventionally, the former would be used but as some banks' financial statements did not provide this information, we used staff costs as a proxy to labour input. It is important to note that some banks do not provide the personnel/staff costs (x 3 ) input for the years 1995 and 1996. Since the focus of this paper is the efficiency performance before and after deregulation, a two-stage approach of the Malmquist productivity index is adopted. First, for the years 1995 to 1999, which represents the period before deregulation, only two inputs, customer deposits (x 1 ) and fixed assets close economic integration with other regional economies. The effects flowed-on to the wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, as well as its financial services sector, with a slowdown in growth in these sectors. In turn the effects reduced the level of loans as well as the accumulated level of fixed assets.
Empirical results
INSERT TABLE 2   INSERT TABLE 3 Since 2000, with the gradual implementation of deregulation and recovery from the financial crisis, growth rates for loans have improved at an average rate of 6.60 percent per annum. However, when compared to the growth rates of inputs, this would suggest that there was little productivity growth. The above comparisons of means, while interesting, do not provide any productivity change analysis. Such an analysis is based on the Malmquist indices of productivity as detailed in Section 2 based on the assumption that banks operate under constant returns-to-scale. These results are presented and analysed below.
Three primary results are derived from the Malmquist indices of productivity growth over the sample period. First, the measurement of productivity change. Second, the decomposition of productivity change into efficiency change (i.e. a 'catch-up' effect) and technological change (i.e. a 'frontier-shift' or 'best-practice frontier' effect).
Third, the 'catch-up' effect is further decomposed into technical efficiency and scale efficiency: this helps explain the main sources of improvement.
INSERT Table 4 clearly shows efficiency change being the main driver of TFP. It is interesting to note that TFP in 1998 was below unity due to a decline in efficiency change, rather than In regards to technological change, its mean score in post-deregulated period compared to the previous period showed signs of improvement (from -32 percent to -21.9 percent), whereas for technical change, this fell from 48.8 percent to 23.4 percent. What this suggests is that in general, banks have begun to adopt best-practice with the adoption of new forms of innovation to improve banking services such as ebanking which improves efficiency and enhances competition and convenience to customers. This is evident from An interesting issue to note is that with the onset of deregulation of Singapore's banking services, the period 2000-05 exhibit lower TFP than before liberalisation.
Economic theory dictates that with deregulation, the level of competition increases and in turn improves efficiency and productivity. Whilst this may not seem to hold true from the findings of Table 4 , it is important to note that the sample size differs between the two periods and that the TFP score that is being examined is only an average score which may be exaggerated as a result of poor performance by just a few banks (ie. outliers). A more concise analysis on TFP would be at the firm level which is examined in Section 4.2. Nevertheless, to ascertain the contributions to the fall in mean TFP between these two periods, we further examine efficiency change as this indicator showed a deprovement between the two periods. Efficiency change is decomposed into pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency and their scores are presented in Table 5.   INSERT TABLE 5 As mentioned earlier the main driver of TFP change for both periods was efficiency change. A decomposition of this indicator into pure technical efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE) would provide more evidence for TFP growth. For the period 1995-1999, most banks were operating efficiently except for the year 1998, which exhibits the effects of the Asian financial crisis in 1997. In 1998, 17 banks were operating inefficiently, indicating that these banks could have saved, on average, 25.3 percent of (that is, 1 -E) in input quantities if they had adopted best practice The Industrial Bank of Japan Ltd. One postulate is that these banks are more nimble and globally focused business with very diverse portfolios. This meant that their production functions were more geographically diversified and would thus emerged less battered by the Asian financial crisis compared to their domestically oriented retail peers.
INSERT TABLE 6
The local banks performed modestly in that 2 of the 5 local banks had TFP over 1.00, namely OUB Holdings and KTB Ltd. TFP growth for UOB holdings and DBS Bank
Ltd fell by 5.7 percent and 8.3 percent, respectively. OCBC Holdings was the worst performer amongst the local banks with TFP growth falling by 11.5 percent. All five local banks however experienced some form of 'catch-up' attributed to improvements in pure technical efficiency -OUB Holdings (3.239), UOB holdings (3.03), DBS Bank Ltd (3.744) and OCBC Holdings (3.394).
INSERT TABLE 7
In the deregulated period, there was some improvement in TFP amongst the local banks. OCBCs' improvement in TFP from -11.5 percent to 0.7 percent would suggest that the merger with KTB was the driving force. Bank of Canada was attributed to deterioration in efficiency change, primarily scale efficiency while for Mizuho Corporate Bank's poor performance this was attributed to falling pure technical efficiency from 36.7 to 0 percent.
In this section, we test our reliability of results using a similar bootstrap approach as outlined by Simar and Wilson (1999) . Confidence intervals at 0.05 level are estimated in order to determine whether changes in productivity, efficiency or technology are statistical significan. As our sample size is rather small, bootstrapping replicates our dataset to generate an appropriate large number of pseudosamples which in our case is B=200. Tables 8, 9 and 10 present the changes in productivity, INSERT TABLE 8   INSERT TABLE 9   INSERT TABLE 10   INSERT TABLE 11   INSERT TABLE 12 INSERT TABLE 13
Concluding Remarks
This paper analysed productivity growth in Singapore's banking sector before and following deregulation. Using a two-stage approach, the Malmquist productivity index allowed a comparison of the changes in productivity in terms of efficiency change and technological change between the pre-deregulated period and postderegulated period. Two outcomes were revealed in our findings. First, the results from our study follow a similar pattern to Gilbert and Wilson (1998) (2006) on Greek banks that deregulation improves productivity growth. In the deregulated period, 7 of the 10 banks experienced some productivity growth, mainly driven by improving best practices (technological change). Second, although no significant 'catch-up' was evident, deregulation improved operational size (i.e. scale efficiency) with the several bank mergers. This was one of the main findings in the current study which aimed at determining the outcome from the mergers of local banks.
Whilst the study has provided some promising results, it should be noted that one of the main limitations of the current study was the use of a small sample size for the second period. A large sample size would have provided more robust results, especially when using the Malmquist productivity index model. Nonetheless, this is a first step towards examining the level of efficiency of Singapore banks since deregulation. Future studies on this would aim at not only increasing the sample size, but to improve on the data outputs where available, such as non-lending activities (securities), risk-adjusted off-balance sheet items, and other earning assets. The study also included a brief statistical inference using a bootstrap approach. The results of which are statistically significant inferring that the Malmquist results can be relied upon.
So has Singapore benefited from deregulating its banking sector? In the years since 2000, there has been some improvement, although it is relatively insignificant. This was the immediate response to the growing foreign competition which resulted in the mergers of many local banks into just a few conglomerates. However, as shown in Lindblom (1994) and the recent crisis of mortgage defaults experienced by some of the major US banks in 2007, complete liberalised financial services can still falter largely due to failure in risk-management and the lack of appropriate countermeasures (ie. like a prudential authority or governing body overseeing the operations).
In the case of Singapore, the process of deregulation is ongoing, and as such it is still in its infancy in terms of deregulation. However, with a governing body like the MAS whose role is to supervise and monitor the operations of banks, and Singapore's sound economic management which has weathered the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis, Singapore is no-doubt in a position prepared for such a crisis.
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